Epistemological fragilities of antimentalism and a possible way out in the behavioral theory of mind

Abstract

On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of B. F. Skinner’s About Behaviorism, this essay revisits the chapter “What is Inside the Skin?” to reassess the philosophical underpin­nings of radical behaviorism. We begin by highlighting the latent distinction between two dimensions of Skinner’s project: as a philosophy of the science of behavior and as a philosophy of mind that advances a behavioral theory of mental or psychological phenomena. We contend that the epistemological justifications offered by Skinner in defense of behaviorist explana­tions are insufficient to substantiate the antimentalist stance. However, the behavioral theory of mind—which conceives of the mind not as an internal causal entity, but as a set of behavior patterns embedded in dynamic relations with the environment—provides a more promising basis for an alternative to mentalism. In this context, antimentalism should be understood less as a rejection of mental constructs for epistemological reasons and more as a consequence of an ontological claim about the nature of psychological phenomena. This thesis should be combined with a moderate theoretical pluralism that avoids exclusivist commitments and seeks to benefit from partial convergences with other research traditions.